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Abstract. We analyze instruments to evaluate investment strategies as new options for co-operatives within the wheat 
production chain. Using a value-based management the extension of our concept, a “cooperative balanced score-
card” is discussed as we propose the further differentiation of the scorecard’s financial perspective. This is a market 
development-driven approach as cooperatives may be regarded as commodity-price-intermediators for their mem-
bers. Proposing this approach we use a simple model of conjoint-hedging in intermediating firms within agribusi-
ness. 
Keywords: Agribusiness, Wheat Production, Cooperatives, Intermediation, Value-based Management, Commodity 
Markets. 
1. Introduction 
Any type of organization has to define its strategy – irrespective of the questions what it does and how it 
wants to achieve it. The organization’s business fields (“what”) have to be defined to handle their goals 
efficiently (“how”). Defining a strategy an organization has to determine its horizontal boundaries identi-
fying the quantities and varieties of products and services it produces (Besanko, 2007, pp. 74) as well as 
its degree of vertical integration (ibid., pp. 136). The definition of a strategy is indispensible for its execu-
tion: A case study of management failures shows that more than 70% up to 90% emerge rather from a bad 
execution than from a bad definition of strategy (Kaplan / Norton, 1996, p. 77; 2001, p. 1; Welge / Al-
Laham, 1997; Mintzberg, 1994, pp. 161). Although the vision is the “sine-qua-non” condition a good ex-
ecution seems to be at least as important. This relationship is grounded for firms in the field of agribusi-
ness just as in any other business field. Bridging the gap between definition and execution of strategies 
the balanced scorecard concept developed by Kaplan and Norton in the 1990ies (Kaplan / Norton, 1992, 
1996b) has proven useful at last (Mooraj et. al., 1999; Beuthien et. al., 2008, p. 186). 
Most of today’s organization must recognize an increased significance of intangible assets contributing to 
their success as we can see as well in the case study of Souza (2007) for Brazilian agribusiness. Trading 
and processing enterprises within the wheat production chain – in this case a cooperative with an own 
wheat processing mill – are significantly responsible for the research on and the consultancy of the cor-
rect application of wheat seed. Including research and (employee-) education strategies we present our 
concept of a cooperative balanced scorecard (see chapter 2). It is designed as a management tool for con-
trolling the (financial) consequences of the firm leader’s decisions considering the achievement of pre-
viously defined strategy. The concept was accomplished concerning the cooperative’s peculiarities lead-
ing to the question: which further strategic perspectives must be considered attentively and need to be 
integrated prospectively (see chapter 3)? 
Comparing other organization of the same business field and regarding the integration of agribusiness 
trade into global markets we identify the emergence of new producer-payment tools on the part of Ger-
man agribusiness: these payments are attached to international (future) markets in ways which we may 
criticize. Assuming a stronger market orientation in Germany we propose another use of these tools. We 
conclude with their integration into our cooperative balanced scorecard to assign them a role concerning 
the organization’s strategy.   3
2. Value-based management for cooperatives 
The emergence of the balanced scorecard concept in the beginning 1990ies is owed to the fact that strate-
gy evaluation was oftentimes realized by measuring key figures derived from a firm’s financial system 
(Nørreklit, 2000). This one-sided approach tends to ignore other needs than the shareholder’s. Moreover, 
strategies oftentimes occur more differentiated e.g. in an intended and a realized way (Mintzberg / Wa-
ters, 1985) making their accomplishment still more difficult to control. Additionally the expressiveness of 
financial key figures opens up with a certain delay i.e. sometimes not until the annual statement of ac-
count.  
Kaplan and Norton claim to identify a serious deficiency in traditional management systems: their inabil-
ity to link a company’s long-term strategy with its short-term actions (Kaplan / Norton, 1996a, p. 56) es-
pecially because the management is overwhelmed with data (Mooraj et. al. 1999, p. 482; Steiner, 1997). 
Handling these limits Kaplan and Norton’s work is based on studies of US-companies to present a con-
cise summary of key success factors of a business, and to facilitate the alignment of business operations 
with the overall strategy (Kaplan / Norton, 2001).  
A strategy can be considered as a shared understanding (which the organization’s elements should have) 
about how the ultimate goal of the organization is to be reached (Reed, 2003, p. 91). Defining its strategy 
an organization’s vision has to be captured as it describes the organization’s ultimate goals. The Balanced 
Scorecard paradigm is that the financial results are obtained by successful implementation of strategic 
initiatives in the key business perspectives – as opposed to being their driving force (Mooraj et. al. 1999, 
p. 482). Kaplan and Norton (1996c, p. 76) propose four perspectives as key drivers of revenue growth:  
￿  Financial perspective 
￿  Perspective of internal business process 
￿  Learning and growth perspective 
￿  Customer perspective 
From each of these perspectives the management has to deduce targets inline with the organization’s 
strategy; target key figures must be derived to control the achievement (Kaplan / Norton, 1996c, p. 76). 
Linking the perspectives with one another and with “revenue growth” Kaplan and Norton (1996c, p. 84) 
suggest a causal-loop-learning model (Argyris, 1991). This results in cause-and-effect-relationships (Kap-
lan / Norton, 1996a, pp. 65-66) linking firm- or organization-individual elements of the four perspectives 
to financial objectives and driving the ROCE (return on capital employed, ibid, p. 67, p. 65). For that rea-
son using the balanced scorecard concept may be considered as a value-based management. 
2.1. Use of balanced scorecards 
Putting a balanced scorecard into practise four major steps for any organization are crucial : (1) clarifying 
and translating the vision and strategy, (2) communicating and linking, (3) planning and target setting, 
and (4) strategic feedback and learning (Lipe / Salterio, 2000, p. 285; Kaplan / Norton, 1993). 
Although quite successful the balanced scorecard concept has encountered criticism by-and-by. Still in 
2000 Zimmermann and Jöhnk survey 24 firms of which nineteen consider the balanced scorecard to be an 
inherent part of their organizations (Zimmermann / Jöhnk, 2000). Speckbacher et. al. (2003, p. 369) ana-
lyze the implementation of balanced scorecards in 194 German-speaking organizations in 2003; they state 
that 9% of the organizations have the concept fully implemented organization-wide, 17% partly, 13% 
were still introducing, 17% had evaluated the concept and 44% didn’t get used to it yet. For 2003 this 
seems to be a limited distribution range for the German case (Ahn, 2005, p. 122).  
Judging the applicability Dinesh and Palmer compare Peter Drucker’s (1954) concept of “management by 
objectives” (MBO) with the balanced scorecards finding relevant similarities (Dinesh / Palmer, 1998, 
p. 365). As MBO is about 40 years older but similar (“based on the on the same philosophies as MBO”, 
ibid, p. 367) they assume similar rising problems e.g. organisations that adopt MBO as a performance 
management system later claim that MBO proved to be more of a hindrance rather than a help (ibid, cit-
ing van Tassel, 1995). Newing (1994) suggests that one of the main balanced scorecard’s weaknesses is 
the complexity and time involved in its development.    4
Kaplan and Norton’s opposite view is that measurement systems add more value than the measures them-
selves, because they develop a clearer picture of the organisation, and the process of developing measures 
provides focus and strategic alignment even as the measures themselves change (Dinesh / Palmer, 1998, 
p. 368, referring to Kaplan / Norton, 1996b). As well de Geuser et. al. (2009) claim for the cases of 76 
business units and their use of a balanced scorecard (1) a better translation of the strategy into operational 
terms, (2) the fact that strategising becomes a continuous process, and (3) the greater alignment of various 
processes, services, competencies and units of an organisation. 
In fact Kaplan and Norton themselves (1996a, p. 77) remark that “the balanced scorecard is not really a 
“strategy formulation” tool”. All in all the organizations’ assessments of the balanced scorecard use turns 
out to be positive regarding the occurred effects (Zimmermann / Jöhnk, 2000, p. 603). We will assume 
that a balanced scorecard may not differentiate false or unrealistic aims from positive ones what may lead 
to a systematic undesirable development promoted by the use of a balanced scorecard. Therefore a bal-
anced scorecard is primarily not designed for the formulation or development of a (new) strategy as it is 
thought to be a “management method”; it is suitable especially for interlinking strategic and operative 
management – a task that the balanced scorecard may solve convincingly (Kieser, 2000, pp. 123,124). 
We will use the balanced scorecard’s advantages when we consider its adaption to cooperatives in the 
agribusiness as these aspects – what we will show for a Brazilian case – are needed. Furthermore this dif-
ferentiation of the concept’s capabilities will help us with our suggestions of integrating further market-
driven strategic aspects which we will identify considering horizontal boundaries of agribusiness. 
2.2. The cooperative balanced scorecard 
Using a balanced scorecard achieving a value-based management for agribusiness means to take the same 
obstacles as in any other case of adapting the value-based management to any other sector. Formulating a 
strategy and putting it into practice is related to the specific business duties of an organization. In the case 
of cooperatives as legal form there is a further chokepoint of adaption as there is a dual nature of coopera-
tives: on the one hand cooperatives in agribusiness trade possess an own business related to economic 
performance in so far as the business itself or at least its member-owners try to avoid bearing losses (in 
the German law a non-profit-maxim is unneeded unlike in Brazilian cooperative law). Insofar thy have a 
financial incentive influencing their interests towards their cooperative. On the other hand this business 
entity is devoted to promote its members’ business: in the case of joint purchase members realize econo-
mies of scale bundling their demand for better (lower) purchase prices or – the case of joint sale – build-
ing up bargaining power for a better sales position. It is coherent that member-owners of a cooperative are 
connected to the financial and customer perspective. As a result the cooperative has to differentiate the 
customer perspective in the fields of non-members and member-customers as drivers of their perfor-
mance. 
 
Figure 1. Payments linking the cooperative’s products & service, financial sphere  
(adaption of Beuthien et. al. 2008, p. 178). 
Assuming that the member-interest is the relevant for the cooperative because it constitutes the “owner”-
interest, an increase in the value of this cooperative can be achieved by means of the “product & service” 
or the “financial” relationships to its members. Following the cooperative’s promotion principles facilitat-
ing members with products and services should be the preferred perspective in the case of agribusiness 
Financial sphere  Products & service 
External creditors 
Customers  Members 
Service receivers 
Equity investors 
State  … 
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cooperatives as opposed to financial promotion. This circumstance has not been realized consequently in 
the German cooperative system, running contrary to the legal assignment (Beuthien et. al., 2008, p. 179; 
Beuthien, 2006). 
Assigning these facts to strategy formulation the existing structural aspects driving competition within an 
industry  have  to  be  recognized  by  the  cooperative  along  the  way.  These  are  (Porter,  1998,  p.  4): 
(1) threats of new market entrants, (2) the bargaining power of buyers, (3) threats of substitute products or 
services, and (4) the bargaining power of the suppliers (as indicated in Figure 1 leaving the left side open 
for further supply chain links; in the case of a cooperative the members are the suppliers for wheat). 
Therefore the cooperative’s management task is to analyze how the market competition forces influence 
the two-fold member relationship compiling these forces regarding an operative management. 
Regarding an adequate case one has to analyze the legal frame agribusiness firms are operating in. Agri-
business and agribusiness trade in Brazil is significantly affected by the role of cooperatives. As a restric-
tion  Brazilian  law  confines  cooperative  executive  leadership  to  members  (Legislação  Cooperativista, 
1993). Cooperatives are excluded from additional “human capital” by legal admission – e.g. as it is em-
bodied by external “professionals” as managing executives. As growing and globalizing business entities 
the need for an increase of management competence of members seems evident. 
To estimate the consequences of the resulting path dependant structures we analyze a large agricultural 
cooperative in Brazil involved in wheat production and processing (Souza, 2007). Defining the relevant 
scorecard perspectives from interviews the field of research was regarded as important likewise by the 
management, specialists and members. The research on new wheat seeds remains to a certain extent in the 
hands of Brazilian cooperatives and of federal institutions in comparison to other countries (in the United 
States it is dominated by few major producers; in Germany the supply side is fragmented by smaller en-
terprises). As a result we propose the following adapted balanced scorecard for this cooperative including 
the perspective’s details (based on quantitative key figures). 
Figure 2. Adapted balanced scorecard for a Brazilian agricultural cooperative engaged in wheat produc-
tion and processing (the business includes a wheat processing mill; own illustration). 
Elaborating this visualized form of operative strategy it is obvious that the impact’s and the reciprocity’s 
intensity between variables remain non-educible. Kaplan and Norton’s (1996c, p. 84) proposed an own 
solution, a causal-loop-model that has been criticized (Akkermans / van Oorschot, 2002; Linard et. al., 
2000; Todd / Palmer, 2000) because “strategic maps” (as Kaplan and Norton name the results) show little 
flexibility explaining the consequences of external impacts or adverse strategic decisions. We propose the 
combination of system dynamics and strategic maps elaborating a cooperative balanced scorecard (Freier 
et. al., 2009) what is in line with latest insights (Schoeneborn, 2003; Capelo / Dias, 2005; Bianchi / Mon-
temaggiore, 2008). As a result a cooperative’s “stock-and-flow map” (derived from system dynamics in-
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stead of Kaplan and Norton’s causal-loops) connects the perspective’s variables quantitatively enabling 
the scorecard concept to be simulated. Concerning the need to realize a strategy the simulation opens up 
the possibility to evaluate the consequences simultaneously giving the cooperative’s management a deci-
sion support tool for strategic controlling. 
3. Intermediation in Agribusiness 
We can conclude so far that putting a strategy into practice and controlling it, seems to be essential for 
organizations in the field of agribusiness wherein the balanced scorecard – although afflicted with certain 
restrictions – can be adapted and used. Presupposing the firm’s vision the balanced scorecard is in fact not 
a “strategy formulation” tool (Dinesh / Palmer, 1998, p. 368, referring to Kaplan / Norton, 1996b).  
Regarding concepts to define strategies economic theory provides four independent approaches of firm 
theory (Spulber, 1992, p. 568), which are (1) the neoclassical theory of the firm, (2) the industrial organi-
zation theory of the firm (industrial economics (Tirole, 1990)), (3) contractual theories of the firm (i.e. 
regarding transaction costs (Grossmann / Hart, 1986)), and (4) organizational incentive theories of the 
firm (regarding agency problems).Each of the approaches creates its own normative “state-of-the-firm”. 
In pursuance of our previous statements it is evident that economic and management perspectives on 
management strategy can and should be integrated (coherent with Spulber, 2003, p. 253). The question 
is – distinguishing between strategy definition and implementation – which elements should be consi-
dered for a firm’s strategy definition and how? 
Spulber’s (2003, p. 257) approach is to combine “economic” and “management” approaches formulating 
an “intermediation theory of the firm”. Both parts are considered in a specific form of analysis. The eco-
nomic approaches are captured in an external analysis (ibid., p. 260) of prospective customers, suppliers, 
competitors, and partners (e.g. by integrating Porter’s competitive strategy as one element of the men-
tioned economic approaches). The internal analysis captures organizational abilities such as structures, 
resources, competencies, and performance (ibid., p. 261). The elements of the internal analysis are close 
to the perspective’s elements of a balanced scorecard; the questions Spulber poses e.g. for performance 
“how can the company’s performance be maintained or improved” can be achieved by analyzing the sys-
tem dynamic elaboration of Kaplan and Norton’s strategic map (Freier et. al. 2009). As already pointed 
out the elaboration of a balanced scorecard doesn’t prevent organizations from enhancing wrong strate-
gies; the examined cooperative has proven the ability to stand competition and generated satisfying re-
sults. Therefore we want to take its structure for granted as a path dependent one now. The cooperative 
balanced scorecard can be used for the purposes of Spulber’s internal analysis. What remains unsolved 
yet is the appreciation of how this organization can stand the elements of Spulber’s external analysis. We 
will go into the matter of new market driven developments as we let the organization pose the question: 
what competitors will we face as companies develop substitute products, new production processes, new 
types of transactions and new combinations of products, services and transactions? 
Spulber (2003, p. 265) concludes that his intermediation theory of the firm shows that managers maintain 
the company’s competitive advantage by creating innovative transactions. The company’s ability to do so 
depends on the presence of market frictions that allow the company to improve on direct interaction be-
tween buyers and sellers. Therefore we will analyse new and innovative transactions in the field of agri-
business in the next step. 
3.1. Risk in Agribusiness  
In this section we want to take into consideration what drives recent agribusiness development identifying 
innovative transactions in this field. One recent impetus came from the bio-fuels directives i.e. a mandato-
ry percentage of fuels used in combustion-engines must be non-fossil. Bio-fuels have led to a land-use-
competition as the production of oilseeds in the EU increased approx. 15% during the period of 2005-
2009 (USDA, 2009, p. 30). In Germany energy production accounts for around 50% of the use of veg oil 
(Carus, 2009). The question if EU bio-fuel policies affect agricultural markets has to be answered in the 
affirmative (Banse et. al. 2008, p. 135). As a consequence prices for agricultural products have risen – a 
positive aspect regarding Spulber’s external analysis for agribusiness trade; regarding the wheat produc-
tion chain as in the case of the presented cooperative the competition for land-use could be regarded in its 
strategy to-be. Eventually bio-fuel and the prices of the related biomass-products are probably intercon-
nected in the other direction as well: the price for crude oil dropped dramatically at least 46% of the pro-  7
duction capacity of biodiesel in Germany remain unused in 2009 (EBB, 2009). Price drivers resulting 
from land-use competition are revealed in markets in which agribusiness firms are directly involved in. 
Another effect resulting from biomass-use for energy is the linkage of agricultural commodity markets to 
the conventions of the existing energy markets.  
Commodity prices and its risks are commonly attached (among others) to systematic risk as climate, geo-
graphy, and policy (Markowitz, 1952). Non-systematic risk includes management errors such as decisions 
concerning wrong product policy. This last type of risk may be completely “hedged” via portfolio selec-
tion – on certain restrictive conditions – on the side of investors as risk takers (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 
1965; Mossin, 1966).  
Among other effects price hedging and other innovative financial instruments have made commodity 
markets accessible for financial investors and risk-takers in significant proportions. Speculative invest-
ment in commodity markets is accentuating price movements due to supply shortfalls of some crops, is 
leading  to  higher  market  volatility,  and  is  pushing  up  the  prices  of  commodities  and  food  products 
(Anderson / Outlaw et al., 2008, pp. 3, pp. 31). We will assume the following relationships looking at a 
typical value chain of production, processing and sale of agricultural commodities: 
 
Figure 3. Differentiation of risk and risk takers (own illustration). 
Apparently farmers in the US are unwilling to give up small amounts of their sales prices per acre for a 
significant reduction in per acre net revenue variance (for the case of insurance, see Just et. al., 1999, 
p. 847). To give an impression we use the following figure (Figure 4) to point out the speculator’s posi-
tions in commodity markets. Obviously the value of the trade volume has increased approximately within 
ten years about threefold. It must be considered that the Standard & Poors GSCI Spot Price Index is com-
posed  of  energy  (69.56%),  industrial  metals  (7.67%),  precious  metals  (3.21%),  agricultural  products 
(14.66%), and livestock (4.90%) putting the role of wheat speculation into perspective. “Commercial po-
sitions” in the sense of CBOT rules refer to traders hedging their own (wheat) asset prices whereas tradi-
tional speculators are involved in commodity trade (arbitrageurs), and index speculators must be per-
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Figure 4. Speculator’s influence on commodity future markets (Rabobank, 2009). 
In recent years, commodity futures markets gained large capital inflows which have driven up trading 
volumes and commodity prices. In 2007 the futures industry could increase its managed funds by 8.7% 
totaling USD 184.8 billion. More recently, investors have also turned to commodities as an alternative 
source of returns in the wake of the sub-prime crisis (Rabobank, 2008). 
As a result commodity markets are increasingly bound to financial markets resulting in an increased vola-
tility of commodity prices. This may lead to unexpected consequences e.g. to the reduction of the produc-
er’s ability to manage price risks using future markets (Andersen et. al., 2008, p. 32). A strong price fluc-
tuation leads to a wider spread between spot and future prices inducing margin calls. This increases the 
price risk of any firm involved in the wheat production chain as considered in Figure 3. In the next sec-
tions we will have a look at the future market’s mode of operation in the case of wheat and the evolving 
innovative transactions in this field. 
3.2. Intermediation in Agribusiness 
In Figure 3 we estimated a three-step general value chain equalizing farmers with the production chain 
link, agribusiness trade with “processing” and “sale” in the case of the mentioned cooperative. One im-
portant aspect to point out is the reluctance of the actors on the production stage to hedge their price risk 
on commodity future markets. Obviously small future traders may increase their business risk in case of 
high volatility of future prices if – in the case of unexpected losses of forward market investments – they 
may receive a “margin call” due to their credibility. Firms operating in the field agribusiness trade – re-
gardless if they are investor-oriented or cooperatives – may operate as price takers. In theory producers, 
processors and sellers can hedge price risks simultaneously linking their organizations with commodity 
future markets. If there is non-systematic risk induced by financial market actors or other organizations 
within the field of agribusiness (see Figure 3) and causing price fluctuation their individual linkage to the 
commodity future market hedges this risk “completely”. This may provoke the question why the actors do 
not cooperate as they face the same problem? There is the option to regard the other chain links as “quasi-
vertically integrated” in the above mentioned sense (Besanko 2007, p. 136). In the case of investor-
oriented firms this may be voluntary as the producers have the choice where they sell – but cooperatives 
have to fulfill their promotion task regarding members not as “pure” customers or suppliers. For that rea-
son the “member’s profit” was regarded as element of the “financial perspective” of the cooperative ba-
lanced scorecard (see Figure 3) expanding the vertical boundaries of the cooperative. If there is coopera-
tion among the actors and speculation raises volatility the question emerges how do actors cooperate, and 
which pricing mechanisms do they use, respectively? 
4. Implementing intermediation in a cooperative balanced scorecard 
To estimate the financial instruments used within the wheat production chain and towards future markets 
the comprehension of these tool’s effects is necessary. We will use a simple model of contracting and 
hedging as basis to analyze the various approaches of the actors. Let us assume a situation with produc-
er’s harvesting wheat once a year (during the timeframe between June and September); speculation oc-
curs on how prices will be fixed in June when the spot market is open and the physical trade of wheat 
starts; additionally there are investors using commodity futures on wheat prices to hedge their own risk   9
from other business fields (e.g. real estate prices). What are possible pricing mechanisms between pro-
ducers and traders (respectively processors) of agribusiness goods? As an example we analyze the pro-
ducer-payment-price-models in the German cooperative system focusing on the larger central coopera-
tives of which – in the course of an intensified competition and mergers process –six remain, playing in 
part the role of primary cooperatives.  
Table 1. Producer payment-pricing (RWKT, 2009) 
Name  Condition  Cost  Pricing 
Market-model, 
daily fixing 
delivery of at least 100t 
wheat by producer, fixed 
quality 
min. 15.5€/t monthly; sell-
ing day: 3€/t freighttage  daily Matif-listing; 
Drop-shipping 
delivery of at least 100t 
wheat by producer, fixed 
quality 
5€/t courtage, 3€/t freigh-
tage  daily Matif-listing 











To get a Matif (Marché A Terme d'Instruments Financiers, Paris) listing-price another pricing-model of a 
different central cooperative presumes three months storage, if the producer wishes to sell his stored 
wheat at current fixed prices the central cooperative will purchase an according contract in Paris. 
4.1. Differentiating financial services 
Before going into detail we will consider a simple model. In the case of cooperation between producer 
and trader (processor / seller in Figure 3) a special incentive structure may occur. We will presume that 
the producer must bear costs of (CP) 120€/t producing wheat, the seller will be able to get a sells bonus of 
10%. Furthermore producer and trader will agree on a trade contract with the fixed price (FP) of 150€/t at 
July 1
st. At the fixed day the spot price (SP) is 160€/t; the margin for the producer will be MP = FP-
CP=150-120= 30 as he has agreed on 150€/t. The trader will have MT=(SP*1.1)-FP=176-150=26. Each of 
them will now consider what he would have earned without a contract agreement: 
Table 2. Resulting matrix with SP > FP 
40                       16 40                     26
producer's revenue
without contracting







40                       16 40                     26
producer's revenue
without contracting








It is obvious that in the case with a spot price higher than the fixed price the producer has no incentive for 
further contraction in contrast to the trader. Let us further assume that producer and seller keep FP = 
150€/t in mind (they learn) during the next harvest period when they agree on trading again, this time 
under terms of spot prices which is SP= 140€/t at July 1
st:    10
Table 3. Resulting matrix with SP < FP 
20                       14 20                     4
producer's revenue
without contracting







20                       14 20                     4
producer's revenue
without contracting








Dependent on the combination of contracting y/n and SP</>FP, different incentives will occur influen-
cing the willingness to cooperate in the next harvest period; we can conclude that both contractors falter 
between their options and obviously the larger the volatility of SP will be over time the greater the loss 
one party must bear from this type of cooperation. There is no equilibrium solution in this estimated situa-
tion for the question contracting or not – from a principal-agent-point of view in each result one side has 
the inherent incentive to violate the contract. 
Another kind of cooperation appears regarding the producer-payment-models with more price transparen-
cy if spot market prices are embedded. Most of the pricing mechanisms in Table 1 have in common that 
they require an “over-the-counter” business with physical trade of wheat between producer and trader, 
what reduces risk on the part of the trader who has now the option for further price speculation. This fos-
ters a situation with few cooperation incentives between the actors as considered in chapter 3.2: they have 
the possibility to hedge their risk on their own. 
The pricing mechanism in which the trader purchases sale-contracts as soon as the producer whishes (who 
must deliver wheat beforehand) may be regarded as a “pseudo-hedging”: The producer may receive dif-
ferent prices at the cost of storing (what is the trader’s business of course) but he is unable to hedge price 
risk before harvesting wheat and transferring it physically to the trader. 
4.2. A simple model of a Conjoint-price-hedging 
Hedging as a risk-reducing instrument comprises presuppositions as any other instrument for this task, 
especially the functioning of future markets is crucial (Pennings / Meulenberg, 1997, p. 295). We do not 
want to join the discussion on the efficiency of risk-reducing tools (Odening / Musshoff, 2001; Garcia / 
Leuthold, 2004) but look on the applicability for strategy formulation and differentiation of our balanced 
scorecard. Farmers trading on future markets must stand the effects of volatility as they may be forced to 
even up their future positions due to margin calls (Anderson / Outlaw et al., 2008, p. 32). Even larger 
trading firms or processors are not immune against it. Defining vertical boundaries a processing and trad-
ing firm in the field of agribusiness may hedge price risk together with the producer by exchanging con-
tracts (Hull, 2006, pp. 649, pp.721). 
We will assume again that producer and trader agree on cooperation, this time exchanging options. To 
convince the producer the trader offers him a bonus (B) of 2€/t in addition to the effective spot price he 
will receive. Again the producer will have to spend CP = 120€/t for his production but in February the 
market price raises because of intense speculation leading him to sell his yield in advance opening a fu-
ture position (short call open) 
+
Feb SC  receiving 180€/t and informing his subsequent trader. The trader is 
now in charge as he will guarantee for the producers ability to fulfil his contract avoiding a “margin call”. 
The trader observes the market attentively now facing that he has to guarantee for either risks and there-
fore buys in May contracts for the same quantity of wheat (long call open) 
-
May LC  paying 145€/t. Both 
parties now possess a future spread of 35€/t. In June the harvests commences leading to “correct” spot 
market prices. Producer and trader come to the agreement to exchange their positions, they have to (1) 
change future positions and (2) exchange physical property as the trader buys from the producer and sells 
the producer’s wheat at the spot market for SP=160€/t at July 1
st. For the purpose of evening their future 
positions producer and seller close their positions. The producer will buy a 
-
July LC  paying 160€/t spot 
price and closing his short call whereas the trader will use 
+
July SC  for the same price closing his long call; 
as result producer and trader receive the following margins:   11
 
62 120 160 180 2 160 C LC SC B SP M P P P T P = - - + + = - + + + =
- +   (1) 
13 145 160 2 160 160 LC B SC SP SP M T T T T = - + - - = - - + - =
- +   (2) 
What has been accomplished with this conjoint hedge is that the producer’s margin is now solely depen-
dent on his ability to generate low costs (CP), his ability to negotiate a high price for his short call 
+
Feb SC  
and on the Bonus (B) he receives from the trader because the spot price he receives from the trader  T SP  
in July is 
-
P LC . Consequently the margin for the producer remains MP=62 even if the spot market price in 
July falls below the necessary production costs of 120€/t (SP<CP)! 
This is different for the trader in our example; he uses the spot market price for the producer and his sale. 
His margin depends on his capability to negotiate his contract price (long call) below the later spot market 
price for wheat and the amount of bonuses he gives producers. The break-even for his transactions is a 
July spot market price of 147€/t covering his contract and bonus expenses in our case. Let us remind that 
without this hedging type the producer would have received MP=40€ instead of 62€ at SP=160€/t, at the 
trader’s break-even-point only SP-CP= 27€. 
4.3. Differentiating the financial scorecard perspective 
Further tools are conceivable, e.g. that the trader uses additional options to limit his losses below the 
break-even price as is already indicated within the producer-payment-pricing mechanisms. In the case 
that the spot market price exceeds 180€/t (what was the producer’s future price) there are further partici-
pations  considerable,  the  producer  could  receive  a  share  of  the  trader’s  margin  (which  is  33  at 
SP=180€/t). This leads to the question: who is responsible for the financial services? The trader could be 
in charge to organize 
+
Feb SC  for the producer. It must be clearly said that in this example the producer 
limits his margin to 62€/t what may be perceived as constraint of flexibility just as in the case of the con-
tract above. Otherwise the producer obtains additional flexibility fixing his future contract influencing his 
own margin putting this argument into perspective. The bonus paid by the trader may compensate this 
additionally.  
One decisive objective is that both actors use a risk diminishing tool that imports new systematic risk as 
seen above but what is now shared conjointly. At the cooperative level in the production chain the inci-
dental surplus will be shared by its members regarding their turnover with the cooperative. 
Consequently we would to distinguish the financial services within the cooperative’s perspectives as there 
is risk in the producers’ and traders’ transactions on commodity markets, and within their conjoint trans-
actions.  We  therefore  propose  to  integrate  “cooperative’s  risk-management”,  “member’s  risk-
management” and “conjoint risk-management” into the perspectives of the cooperative balanced score-
card. As key figures we suggest the number of instruments and the traded volume of these instruments. 
Furthermore the organization’s strategic map should be reviewed regarding further possible aspects that 
could be hedged conjointly.   12
Figure 5. Adapted balanced scorecard. 
5. Conclusions 
Differentiating strategies for organizations in the field of agribusiness we started with the question how 
strategies must be defined and implemented in firms of agribusiness. Strategy implementation leads us to 
the discussion about the applicability of the balanced scorecard as a management tool which must strictly 
not be apprehended as a “strategy formulation tool”. Although conditioned with certain restrictions we 
consider it as expedient tool that has to be adapted.  
In regard to strategy formulation we go into the matter of Spulber’s intermediation theory in order to 
bridge the formulation and implementation gap. Spulber’s theory opens up a wide research field of which 
we can pick up only parts as we use it to search further and prospective elements to enhance our coopera-
tive balanced scorecard questioning which further elements have to be regarded by firms of agribusiness. 
We succeed in identifying conjoint risk hedging as new element that can be implemented in the coopera-
tive scorecard.  
Recapitulating these facts it is obvious that at this point the new balanced scorecard must be put into prac-
tice. This means convincing members, managers, stakeholders and established structures introducing new 
elements into an organization. Especially the identified reluctance of farmers to use future contracts or 
insurances will be a barrier that will probably enhance regarding conjoint risk hedging or the use of the 
adapted balanced scorecard likewise.  
For the Brazilian case we propose the computer aided simulation of the scorecard’s elements as a decision 
support tool for the management especially because of the cooperative’s peculiarities. For the field of 
agribusiness in general we recommend the communication of the possibilities of conjoint risk hedging. 
The German central cooperative’s producer-pricing mechanisms can be criticized whereas we interpret 
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